Note: The War in Afghanistan has just entered its ninth year with no end in sight. This assessment of the situation was written eight years back towards the end of September, 2001 for personal record. I recently recovered it from the heap of digital record. It is being uploaded with minor editing to correct grammatical mistakes without changing the contents.
The attacks in New York and Washington in USA on 11 September 2001 would reveal their impact on USA and the rest of the globe in many ways. Besides demanding a rethink on internal and external security apparatus of the western states the shattered Twin Towers would cast long shadows on the US and world economy. The potential economic damage would only exacerbate the feeling of loss of face in the USA.
On the other hand effectiveness of the Asymmetric Warfare, as demonstrated by a handful of people, has caught the US Intelligence Services and military totally unaware. The use of giant airliners in these attacks has brought out the inadequacy of the concept of airtight national defense through National Missile Defense (NMD). Human ingenuity and willingness of people to go to any length in pursuit of their objectives has once again compelled military strategists to devote time and resources to fight a new enemy. Incidents of 11th September are likely to become catalysts of lasting change in global geo-strategic environment.
In the short-term perspective USA’s declaration of war and its identification of Osama Bin Laden (OBL) along with the Taliban regime as the prime targets of her imminent military campaign is a forecast of mayhem in the region. Predictions of an ‘unconventional protracted war’ against terrorism make things even more complex for the affected countries- in this case primarily Afghanistan and Pakistan. The objective of the impending operations is cited as “to bring justice to the aggrieved”, thus the name ‘Infinite Justice’ for the campaign.
The US Govt’s request for Pakistan’s support in operations in Afghanistan requires sharing of intelligence information, allowing use of air space and provision of ground for support of Logistics. Pakistan’s participation from the US side would have long lasting effects on security environment of the region in general and Pakistan in particular. The strategic reverberations would greatly depend on the intensity and duration of US operations, which in turn would entirely depend on the choice of objectives against an elusive set of targets.
US objectives in Afghanistan could include:-
a. Getting OBL ‘dead or alive’
b. Elimination of OBL and the Taliban top hierarchy but leaving a humbled Taliban regime to fight yet another civil war.
c. Targeting OBL along with Taliban top leadership and subsequently replacing Taliban regime with a hand picked pro-west government.
None of the three objectives can be achieved without some sort of ground operation. Even in the case of first objective the US leadership would prefer independent confirmation of success of its operations. It could either use the Northern Alliance to confirm elimination of OBL or move its own heli-bome troops to cap the air assault. Selection of second or the third objective would make landing of ground troops almost an essential requirement; only the third objective would demand long term American presence to sustain the newly installed regime. Even the pursuit of second objective could see American soldiers bogged down in a very difficult terrain for a very long time.
The set of vital targets comprises a group of people that would remain dispersed during the war to avoid neutralization. OBL and Afghan leadership would find it equally easy to melt in the wilderness or to mix with the common man in populated areas. Either of the choices would present target quite unlike Iraq. Terrain, weather and resilience of the Afghan people would make the targets even more obscure. Chasing the human targets US Forces are most likely to go overboard since they will have nothing spectacular to show to their expectant commanders and the people back home.
US operations in Afghanistan would start on a pattern similar to the ones against Iraq in the Gulf War. However, with no aircraft to shoot down, and no aircraft and tanks to hunt in their hideouts US airstrikes would largely concentrate on possible hideouts of OBL and Afghan leadership. Deserted Mujahideen camps would lend themselves as another set of targets.
Air strikes over terrain in Northern Afghanistan, which could be a possible hideout, with conventional munitions promise little chances of success. At the same time ground assaults prior to ‘softening up’ would be fraught with high attrition. Carpet-bombing of selected areas and extensive use of Fuel Air Explosives are the likely tactics in the initial campaign. With an array of precision-guided munitions US forces would target key command centres in the cities and the rural areas. Human targets taking refuge in the populated areas could also be targeted with PGMs and any collateral damage would be regarded legitimate.
The inability of US air campaign to achieve desired objectives could frustrate the US administration to a level where use of tactical nuclear weapons may be considered as an option. While use of these weapons could achieve desired results, the expected backlash in the Muslim countries and a possible condemnation by the international community suggests this to be an option of last resort.
Pursuit of a larger set of targets and US decision to replace Afghan rulers (the third objective) would necessitate troop landings by helicopter force or transport fleet. For major landings capture of a air force base in Afghanistan appears essential. Putting forces down in Afghanistan would obviously require logistics buildup and support, for which bases in Pakistan would obviously be required. Air operations may not be vastly different than those in the first case, but here land operations would be at a much larger scale. After softening the target area, land forces would be required to secure airfields and areas for making launching pads for helicopter operations or for establishing a supply chain for the forward troops.
In a long term scenario PAF bases come out as an important need for US operations because of the already existing infrastructure that includes operating surfaces, airfield utility services, POL supply lines, medical facilities and shelter for troops etc; thus preferred choice would be a functional base.
The success of US operations is largely dependent upon accuracy of intelligence information. It is for this reason that Pakistan has been asked for help. Additionally, the analysis of the damage incurred would rest more on human intelligence (HUMINT) than the satellites. While satellites and UAVs would be extensively used, the Humint from Pakistan and Northern Alliance would be considered extremely valuable. Landing Special Ops teams in the vicinity of targets to assist air strikes could be undertaken at certain risk of attrition.
Implications for Pakistan
Pakistan’s involvement in operations in Afghanistan could be under one of the two distinct scenarios.
a. US forces, stationed in Middle East along with the Carrier Task Force (CTF), are tasked for strikes in Afghanistan utilizing Pakistan’s airspace for over flying aircraft and missiles.
b. The US elects to station her forces in Pakistan in addition to forces mentioned above. PAF Bases would be used for logistics buildup, fighter operations and heli-borne landings. These operations, depending upon their objectives, could be spread over a long period of time.
If the US forces achieve objectives by air operations alone and choose to withdraw, the ramifications for the region would not be as severe as against those when she lands forces with long-term plans. While Iran and China are not likely to bring about a major change in their relations with Pakistan, association with Afghanistan would experience a qualitative degradation. Once again the influx of refugees would add to the complexity of the relationship. Domestic destabilization and the type and degree of damage incurred would ascertain the extent of hostility the post crisis Afghanistan may have towards Pakistan.
No immediate military threat from Afghanistan is expected to take shape since the war ravaged country would need long time and vast resources to rebuild its armed forces; more so a potent Air Force. A post crisis Taliban regime would be definitely hostile to Pakistan but we may still be the only friends they could count on for the future basic needs and for starting a rebuilding process. Humane handling of the refugees by Pakistan and a reconstruction of infrastructure by international community through Pakistan could quickly redevelop an understanding and improve relations. Installing a neutral government by the US for undertaking a rebuilding process would be fraught with dangers of unremitting continuation of civil war that could again spill over across the border and seriously disturb our society.
India seeing a distinct possibility of warming up of relations between Pakistan and the USA would attempt to create a wedge by projecting GoP as isolated and devoid of public support. It may covertly encourage its own Muslim community to take to the streets in support of Afghanistan people to arouse public sentiment both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Indian media would cover the conflict in a manner to subtly suggest it as a clash of civilizations.
US decision to situate itself in the region for longer duration would spell deeper trouble for the region. As is evident public rejection of US invasion would be as complete as it was for the Soviet adventure. Afghanistan may not see peace for a long time. Large-scale disapproval by populace and active resistance by religious groups in Pakistan may manifest itself in subversive activities at a scale reminiscent of Afghan War.
Iran and China will strongly disapprove presence of US forces at their doorsteps. This may bring irreparable strain on our relations with these neighbors resulting in cooling down of relationship and outright cancellation or slowing down of many planned projects. An unfriendly Iran could add to strategic uncertainties.
In the longer term India would find the environment conducive to forge alliances with Iran and a hostile Afghanistan posing a multi-directional threat. A freak twist in geo-politics may witness China-India nexus emerging in opposition to US physical presence in the region, thus depriving Pakistan of the time-tested friendship.
American presence in Pakistan could grant her the leverage to influence our policies particularly in Kashmir. Unless assured there would remain a tacit threat to our nuclear facilities. This time it would deprive us of any early warning or enough time to shut down the plants to limit the damage.
On the contrary US presence may usher in an extended period of peace and stability in the region. This, however, may or may not involve resolution of Kashmir issue. Pakistan may be allowed breathing space to build its economy on technically sound footing. Pakistan military may also come out stronger, however, the heightened expectations are likely to blur long-term strategic implications.
Conclusion. American attack on Afghanistan would transform the geo-political set up of the region. Cautious identification of area targets and even more careful selection of weapons would be required to control the backlash in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, it is unlikely that Afghanistan would have the energy and resources to put together a military threat to Pakistan. At the same time its ability to cause destruction through sabotage and subversion should not be underestimated. Pakistan would need diplomatic ingenuity to come out of this chaos in a graceful manner. More than anything else it must maintain a bond with Afghan people by taking care of the refugees better than it was possible in the recent past. Attendant with some rewards would be the risks of losing old friendships and facing hostile alliances in the longer term.
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