THE COUNTRY MIGHT BREAK UP
Note: This article was written on 13th February 2011 and shared through email with readers.

We had travelled halfway through the month of May and the nation was holding its breath. The air was thick with uncertainty and anxiety. The year was 1998 and India had just gone ahead with a series of peaceful nuclear explosions. There was immense international pressure on Pakistan not to follow suit. Public opinion at home was overwhelmingly in favour of standing up against the external pressure and openly declaring our status as a sovereign nuclear state.
There was the lure of billions of dollars and a security umbrella by the only superpower if we showed restraint. On the stick side, there were threats of comprehensive economic and military sanctions. Media, at home and abroad, incessantly discussed impending economic hardships in case we defied the international diktat. The argument against the nuclear option got extended to the dangers of country's breakup under economic hardships as our people were not used to economic depravation and physical discomfort.
There were others who held the opinion it was the best time in our history to test our claims to nationhood. Even at the risk of disintegration. Their argument was based on the conviction that people who struggled together rarely fell apart. The camaraderie developed during hard times went a long way in life—both personal and national. It were the friends of good times that took flight at the first indication of adversity.
Pakistan, today again, finds itself at crossroads similar to May 1998. Thanks to Mr Raymond Davis’ (or whatever his real identity is) proclivity to kill natives. We once again face all sorts of threats that include economic sanctions, denial of loans from international lending institutions and host of other diplomatic measures, in case we allow law of the land to take its course. Remember the fragile state of our mismanaged economy. Aid worth of Billions of dollars is at stake so are the loans worth billions of precious dollars. State runs the danger of loan default and a possible bankruptcy. Our nation will not be able to stand the economic hardships if we act as independent people. The country might break up.
Ever wonder for how long are we the people of Pakistan going to run this gauntlet of ‘national breakup’? For how long are we destined to live like a scared child? Was there ever a better time to once again prove our claim to nationhood? This time once for all; even at the risk of disintegration. Remember, lest you get scared, that people who struggle together seldom fall apart. In adversity we come together. If the blessed ones of our nation stand by the lesser endowed ones there is no reason that we can’t walk tall. Remember we are talking of daylight murders in public eye of our own citizens. Let’s get over with this myth of economic hardships causing national breakup. And who better to lead than the elected government. There is talk of revolution in the air, anyway.

PS. I place this write up on my blog with the knowledge that the murderer was allowed to fly out of the country under an arrangement with 'all stakeholders'. I hang my head in sorrow.

The War in Afghanistan and its Likely Impact on Pakistan: An Assessment

Note: The War in Afghanistan has just entered its ninth year with no end in sight. This assessment of the situation was written eight years back towards the end of September, 2001 for personal record. I recently recovered it from the heap of digital record. It is being uploaded with minor editing to correct grammatical mistakes without changing the contents.


The attacks in New York and Washington in USA on 11 September 2001 would reveal their impact on USA and the rest of the globe in many ways. Besides demanding a rethink on internal and external security apparatus of the western states the shattered Twin Towers would cast long shadows on the US and world economy. The potential economic damage would only exacerbate the feeling of loss of face in the USA.

On the other hand effectiveness of the Asymmetric Warfare, as demonstrated by a handful of people, has caught the US Intelligence Services and military totally unaware. The use of giant airliners in these attacks has brought out the inadequacy of the concept of airtight national defense through National Missile Defense (NMD). Human ingenuity and willingness of people to go to any length in pursuit of their objectives has once again compelled military strategists to devote time and resources to fight a new enemy. Incidents of 11th September are likely to become catalysts of lasting change in global geo-strategic environment.

In the short-term perspective USA’s declaration of war and its identification of Osama Bin Laden (OBL) along with the Taliban regime as the prime targets of her imminent military campaign is a forecast of mayhem in the region. Predictions of an ‘unconventional protracted war’ against terrorism make things even more complex for the affected countries- in this case primarily Afghanistan and Pakistan. The objective of the impending operations is cited as “to bring justice to the aggrieved”, thus the name ‘Infinite Justice’ for the campaign.

The US Govt’s request for Pakistan’s support in operations in Afghanistan requires sharing of intelligence information, allowing use of air space and provision of ground for support of Logistics. Pakistan’s participation from the US side would have long lasting effects on security environment of the region in general and Pakistan in particular. The strategic reverberations would greatly depend on the intensity and duration of US operations, which in turn would entirely depend on the choice of objectives against an elusive set of targets.

US objectives in Afghanistan could include:-
a. Getting OBL ‘dead or alive’
b. Elimination of OBL and the Taliban top hierarchy but leaving a humbled Taliban regime to fight yet another civil war.
c. Targeting OBL along with Taliban top leadership and subsequently replacing Taliban regime with a hand picked pro-west government.

None of the three objectives can be achieved without some sort of ground operation. Even in the case of first objective the US leadership would prefer independent confirmation of success of its operations. It could either use the Northern Alliance to confirm elimination of OBL or move its own heli-bome troops to cap the air assault. Selection of second or the third objective would make landing of ground troops almost an essential requirement; only the third objective would demand long term American presence to sustain the newly installed regime. Even the pursuit of second objective could see American soldiers bogged down in a very difficult terrain for a very long time.

The set of vital targets comprises a group of people that would remain dispersed during the war to avoid neutralization. OBL and Afghan leadership would find it equally easy to melt in the wilderness or to mix with the common man in populated areas. Either of the choices would present target quite unlike Iraq. Terrain, weather and resilience of the Afghan people would make the targets even more obscure. Chasing the human targets US Forces are most likely to go overboard since they will have nothing spectacular to show to their expectant commanders and the people back home.

US operations in Afghanistan would start on a pattern similar to the ones against Iraq in the Gulf War. However, with no aircraft to shoot down, and no aircraft and tanks to hunt in their hideouts US airstrikes would largely concentrate on possible hideouts of OBL and Afghan leadership. Deserted Mujahideen camps would lend themselves as another set of targets.

Air strikes over terrain in Northern Afghanistan, which could be a possible hideout, with conventional munitions promise little chances of success. At the same time ground assaults prior to ‘softening up’ would be fraught with high attrition. Carpet-bombing of selected areas and extensive use of Fuel Air Explosives are the likely tactics in the initial campaign. With an array of precision-guided munitions US forces would target key command centres in the cities and the rural areas. Human targets taking refuge in the populated areas could also be targeted with PGMs and any collateral damage would be regarded legitimate.

The inability of US air campaign to achieve desired objectives could frustrate the US administration to a level where use of tactical nuclear weapons may be considered as an option. While use of these weapons could achieve desired results, the expected backlash in the Muslim countries and a possible condemnation by the international community suggests this to be an option of last resort.

Pursuit of a larger set of targets and US decision to replace Afghan rulers (the third objective) would necessitate troop landings by helicopter force or transport fleet. For major landings capture of a air force base in Afghanistan appears essential. Putting forces down in Afghanistan would obviously require logistics buildup and support, for which bases in Pakistan would obviously be required. Air operations may not be vastly different than those in the first case, but here land operations would be at a much larger scale. After softening the target area, land forces would be required to secure airfields and areas for making launching pads for helicopter operations or for establishing a supply chain for the forward troops.

In a long term scenario PAF bases come out as an important need for US operations because of the already existing infrastructure that includes operating surfaces, airfield utility services, POL supply lines, medical facilities and shelter for troops etc; thus preferred choice would be a functional base.

The success of US operations is largely dependent upon accuracy of intelligence information. It is for this reason that Pakistan has been asked for help. Additionally, the analysis of the damage incurred would rest more on human intelligence (HUMINT) than the satellites. While satellites and UAVs would be extensively used, the Humint from Pakistan and Northern Alliance would be considered extremely valuable. Landing Special Ops teams in the vicinity of targets to assist air strikes could be undertaken at certain risk of attrition.

Implications for Pakistan

Pakistan’s involvement in operations in Afghanistan could be under one of the two distinct scenarios.

a. US forces, stationed in Middle East along with the Carrier Task Force (CTF), are tasked for strikes in Afghanistan utilizing Pakistan’s airspace for over flying aircraft and missiles.

b. The US elects to station her forces in Pakistan in addition to forces mentioned above. PAF Bases would be used for logistics buildup, fighter operations and heli-borne landings. These operations, depending upon their objectives, could be spread over a long period of time.

If the US forces achieve objectives by air operations alone and choose to withdraw, the ramifications for the region would not be as severe as against those when she lands forces with long-term plans. While Iran and China are not likely to bring about a major change in their relations with Pakistan, association with Afghanistan would experience a qualitative degradation. Once again the influx of refugees would add to the complexity of the relationship. Domestic destabilization and the type and degree of damage incurred would ascertain the extent of hostility the post crisis Afghanistan may have towards Pakistan.

No immediate military threat from Afghanistan is expected to take shape since the war ravaged country would need long time and vast resources to rebuild its armed forces; more so a potent Air Force. A post crisis Taliban regime would be definitely hostile to Pakistan but we may still be the only friends they could count on for the future basic needs and for starting a rebuilding process. Humane handling of the refugees by Pakistan and a reconstruction of infrastructure by international community through Pakistan could quickly redevelop an understanding and improve relations. Installing a neutral government by the US for undertaking a rebuilding process would be fraught with dangers of unremitting continuation of civil war that could again spill over across the border and seriously disturb our society.

India seeing a distinct possibility of warming up of relations between Pakistan and the USA would attempt to create a wedge by projecting GoP as isolated and devoid of public support. It may covertly encourage its own Muslim community to take to the streets in support of Afghanistan people to arouse public sentiment both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Indian media would cover the conflict in a manner to subtly suggest it as a clash of civilizations.

US decision to situate itself in the region for longer duration would spell deeper trouble for the region. As is evident public rejection of US invasion would be as complete as it was for the Soviet adventure. Afghanistan may not see peace for a long time. Large-scale disapproval by populace and active resistance by religious groups in Pakistan may manifest itself in subversive activities at a scale reminiscent of Afghan War.

Iran and China will strongly disapprove presence of US forces at their doorsteps. This may bring irreparable strain on our relations with these neighbors resulting in cooling down of relationship and outright cancellation or slowing down of many planned projects. An unfriendly Iran could add to strategic uncertainties.

In the longer term India would find the environment conducive to forge alliances with Iran and a hostile Afghanistan posing a multi-directional threat. A freak twist in geo-politics may witness China-India nexus emerging in opposition to US physical presence in the region, thus depriving Pakistan of the time-tested friendship.

American presence in Pakistan could grant her the leverage to influence our policies particularly in Kashmir. Unless assured there would remain a tacit threat to our nuclear facilities. This time it would deprive us of any early warning or enough time to shut down the plants to limit the damage.

On the contrary US presence may usher in an extended period of peace and stability in the region. This, however, may or may not involve resolution of Kashmir issue. Pakistan may be allowed breathing space to build its economy on technically sound footing. Pakistan military may also come out stronger, however, the heightened expectations are likely to blur long-term strategic implications.

Conclusion. American attack on Afghanistan would transform the geo-political set up of the region. Cautious identification of area targets and even more careful selection of weapons would be required to control the backlash in Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, it is unlikely that Afghanistan would have the energy and resources to put together a military threat to Pakistan. At the same time its ability to cause destruction through sabotage and subversion should not be underestimated. Pakistan would need diplomatic ingenuity to come out of this chaos in a graceful manner. More than anything else it must maintain a bond with Afghan people by taking care of the refugees better than it was possible in the recent past. Attendant with some rewards would be the risks of losing old friendships and facing hostile alliances in the longer term.

Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Pakistan

Swat and, hence, Pakistan may just have moved away from the edge of chaos but being at a certain distance from the precipice is certainly no indication of the end of chaos. The raging insurgency has not only destroyed the state infrastructure in the area but also the societal bonds between its various constituent components. The country faces a huge post conflict reconstruction issue—both physical and political. In my view return of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) is taking place in an environment that would remain conducive for the return of Tehrek-e-Nifaz-e-Shar’ia-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and their like under some other name and banner. Realisation that conditions in Swat and Malakand have to change is as important as the inevitability of IDP’s return journey. There is an urgent need to put in place a thinking process that finds a solution embodying durable peace and sustainable economic development for each conflict affected area.

Looking for a solution we may find common ground on three points. First, the nation in its total rejection of the extremism supported government action against the militants in Swat and elsewhere; second, the military action is not going to ‘eliminate’ the extremist elements from these areas and especially from our society; third, there is a need to find a ‘durable’ solution specific to each area.

The second point makes realization of the third one even more challenging, as it asks for a resolution which has ‘integration of the surviving militant individuals and groups in society’ as its integral element, for there would be no durable solution without managing the threat posed by the misled and misused, if they remain ostracised. It asks for fighting the disease without banishing the inflicted. Hence, any durable solution should have two fundamental elements—physical as well as political reconstruction.

The relatively easier of the two is reconstruction of the physical infrastructure— education and health facilities, roads, power and water supply—for when funds are available these are tangible goals with defined milestones. The tougher one is the ‘post-conflict political reconstruction’, of which there is little evidence that any institutional efforts are being considered at this instant. One is aware of the danger of using the term ‘post- conflict’ as it is way premature to raise the banner proclaiming ‘mission accomplished’. On the other hand, we can hardly wait for the total surrender or elimination of the militants before starting the reconstruction process in areas where comparatively peaceful conditions have been achieved.

Our experience of handling victims of the October 2005 earthquake points to three stages of the recovery process from the natural disasters—rescue, sustain and rehabilitate—the same process should hold true for the manmade disasters (read evacuate, sustain and rehabilitate) with an additional requirement of a near perfect security environment.

Beginning the third stage ie rehabilitation in Swat, which starts with the return of IDPs to what were their homes, the state must recall that returning hapless people to devastated lands is just the first step in a process that would need perseverance and unwavering commitment. We shouldn’t forget that four years down, the October Earthquake victims are still in the process of catching up with their lives. With homes and livelihoods destroyed, a paltry sum of Rs 25000 given by the GoP would help Swat’s IDPs live through only the first few days with ghastly prospects of impoverished life ahead.

Royal Geographical Society (RGS) in its report on reconstruction in Afghanistan ‘Post-war Reconstruction: Forever Re-inventing the Wheel’, noted, “The challenge of rebuilding war-torn societies is infinitely more difficult and complex than is generally recognised. The challenges of 'normal' development processes in countries emerging from conflict are amplified by the legacy of the conflict (including: physical destruction, lack of financial, material and human resources, institutional fragility, political volatility and psycho-social trauma). It more importantly says, “Perhaps the greatest lesson from successful post-war reconstruction is the importance of a clear vision for post-war recovery. Moreover, what is critical to the achievement of that vision is not the 'What?' of post-war reconstruction, but the 'How?’; a vision for a participatory process that includes local people is vital.”

Naturally the vital first step is to develop a reconstruction and reconciliation vision for the communities emerging out of conflict at the local level and for the nation as a whole. The onus squarely lies on the leadership at local and national level to put forth its visualisation of the future, and also on the intelligentsia to help leadership develop the mental picture. Needless to say restoring the old way of life would hardly qualify as a vision. Similarly making Swat ‘Switzerland of Pakistan’ would also fail the test of a vision statement though it might sound like a good political slogan.

The second step in the process is to admit that one of the least developed areas (LDA) of the country has been further pushed back in the abyss of poverty. There are shattered families, destroyed livelihoods, damaged and plundered homes, diminished health facilities, even lesser schools especially for the girls, broken roads and skeleton power infrastructure; there is hardly any government in the area except Army and other Law enforcing Agencies (LEAs), if that is considered enough presence of a state in a conflict torn area that needs rebuilding. The challenge for the leadership is a complete grasp of the situation and the scale of the task that lies ahead, if the purpose is to integrate this region in the mainstream and not let it slip back in time.

The vital third step for the physical reconstruction is the need ‘to place our money where our mouth is’, since simple rhetoric has stopped travelling too far. First and foremost requirement in these areas would be sustenance for which there needs to be a meaningful programme focused on job creation. In the short term people of the area should be involved in all reconstruction activities to enable them to buy food and they should have roof on their heads before the harsh winter sets in; in the longer term, alongside Balochistan, Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) should also be established in Swat and Malakand to rescue people from the shackles of abject poverty. Instead of waiting for the foreign allies legislating on the subject we should make local legislation to encourage industry in these and other lesser developed areas of the country. Remember the mouth and the money.

One comes across a similar observation on the need to have a revitalised economy in war torn areas in a US Congressional Research Services (CRS) report, ‘Afghanistan: Challenges and Options for Reconstructing a Stable and Moderate State’, wherein authors comment, ”Up to a certain point the reestablishment of normal life could allow armed fighters to return to peaceful civilian pursuits, but a resurrected traditional economy cannot provide enough jobs or the right kinds of jobs to fully absorb the ranks of the former combatants of whatever stripe. Without jobs, and without a public educational system, young Afghan men are likely to gravitate to the service of warlords and/or to study in the Islamic madrassas, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan.”

We learnt from our earthquake reconstruction experience that developmental solutions evolved in local environment and specific conditions were effective, durable and less expensive. However, there is plenty to adopt from reconstruction experiences of states and international community in Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. One such idea that comes to mind is functioning of ‘Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq. Another CRS report of June 2008, ‘Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq’ elaborates the concept of PRTs as, “ Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) continue to help provincial development by strengthening local government capacity, political and economic development, reconciliation, rule of law implementation and basic services delivery. Their support of provincial governments was essential in the effort to develop ‘Provincial Development Strategies’, which outline the provincial objectives and areas of focus for the next three to five years, for 17 of the 18 Iraqi provinces.”

GoP could form professional teams drawing on the best available expertise, give them any fancy name and deploy them in aid of provincial government. Their mandate could span from preparing master plan for development to implementing it with the help of provincial government and in the process build capacity of the government institutions, carry out intra-agency coordination, liaison with international donor agencies on specific projects, promote reconciliation and strengthen local security arrangements.

Taking up the political reconstruction I visualise building on what already exists on ground—the social fibre of the area of which religious beliefs and traditions remain an integral part. The anger of local people against Taliban is a rejection of their brutal ways and total disregard of local sensibilities and not of the religion itself; hence this subject needs a thoughtful treatment. Let me pick up a comment from an earlier quoted report by RGS which says it better, “Religious belief is of great importance to people within many war-torn societies, and in some, though not all situations, religious differences, may have been emphasised by 'conflict entrepreneurs', in a bid to exploit and exacerbate conflict. Attempts at grafting western conceived notions of secularism on to deeply religious societies should be resisted. Rather, emphasis needs to be placed on promoting inter-community dialogue, helping people to re-connect with the traditions of tolerance and inter-dependence, which have often characterised their previously highly diverse communities, for centuries.”

Mosques would continue to influence religious and political thought in the area. We need to give them the status of educational institutions and, hence, support them administratively and financially. Government should include all mosques in its plan for reconstruction of schools, provision sustained financial support and ensure appointment of educated and reputable Imams in all mosques from the local population. Falling in the wrong hands we have seen these places of worship and learning become hubs of extremism. I am of the opinion that our mosques need our utmost attention, more so now.

Insurgency has severely strained social relationships in these communities. Earlier we witnessed Talibans executing innocent people in town squares and now we see their bodies hanging from poles in the same places. These are the signs of a severely brutalised society. People have been maltreated for a very long time and left ignored by those who had the means but not the will to protect them. Followers of Maulana Sufi Mohammad and Maulana Fazalullah and their victims share the same homes, streets and villages; moreover, formation of state-encouraged local Lashkars has pitted tribes and villages against each other spawning enmities that could run for generations causing endless bloodshed and misery. So what we have is broken families and ruptured communities. While we must punish those who in their quest for unlimited power misled others and committed unforgivable crimes our eye must search for people who can become part of the solution. The need is reconciliation and not recrimination. In not too distant a past South African ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ was ‘country’s choice of a path of healing and reconciliation as the way forward rather than violence or punishment. It was a great example to the rest of the world about how to deal with internal conflict.’

John G Stoessinger in his masterly work, ‘Why Nations Go to War” observes, “In our time, unless the vanquished is destroyed completely, a victor’s peace is seldom lasting, those peace settlements that are negotiated on a basis of equality are much more permanent and durable.” Conflict torn regions need a peace which is all inclusive—restores relationships between people and communities—durable and one that ensures respect and prosperity for the people.

Coming back to the vision statement, it answers the question, ‘where do we want to go? It defines the ‘intended or desired future state.’ My vision statement for a Swat emerging out of the ashes of the conflict would be, “A region of stable peace, prosperity and integrated tolerant communities